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Abstract
Our survey of private manufacturing ﬁrms ﬁnds the size of hidden ‘unofﬁcial’ activity to
be much larger in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. A comparison
of cross-country averages shows that managers in Russia and Ukraine face higher effective
tax rates, worse bureaucratic corruption, greater incidence of maﬁa protection, and have less
faith in the court system. Our ﬁrm-level regressions for the three Eastern European
countries ﬁnd that bureaucratic corruption is signiﬁcantly associated with hiding output.
Ó 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Corruption; Taxation; Legal system; Unofﬁcial economy
JEL classiﬁcation: H26; K42; O17
1. Introduction
A substantial part of output in many developing and post-communist transition
economies goes unreported. This ‘unofﬁcial economy’ impedes economic growth
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in various ways. First, ﬁrms operating underground cannot make use of market-
supporting institutions like the courts and so may invest too little, as de Soto
(1989) argues occurs in Peru. Second, doing business in secret generates
distortions because of the effort needed to avoid detection and punishment.
Resources that are hidden may not ﬁnd their highest-value uses, as Shleifer and
Vishny (1993) suggest happens in Africa. Third, underreporting costs the
government tax revenue that it might otherwise have put to worthwhile use.
According to the Latin American evidence of Loayza (1996), a smaller under-
ground sector is associated with higher tax collections, which pay for better public
infrastructure and thus lead to faster economic growth.
Why do ﬁrms operate in the unofﬁcial economy? The literature offers four
explanations of why ﬁrms hide, which, while not mutually exclusive, have distinct
policy implications. First, entrepreneurs may go underground when statutory tax
rates are high and other ofﬁcial regulations are onerous (de Soto, 1989; Schneider
and Enste, 1998). Cutting taxes and red tape are, according to this view, the main
ways to bring ﬁrms into the ofﬁcial economy. Second, the unofﬁcial economy may
be due primarily to predatory behavior by government ofﬁcials, seeking bribes
from anyone with ofﬁcially registered economic activity (Shleifer and Vishny,
1993; Kaufmann, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Kaufmann, 1997; Shleifer,
1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; S. Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton,
1998). In this view the problem that needs to be addressed is bureaucratic
corruption. Third, ﬁrms might hide some of their output to escape extortion by
criminal gangs (Zhuravskaya and Frye, 1998). In this view the remedy is better
policing and enforcement of the criminal laws. Fourth, the unofﬁcial economy may
result from the inadequacy of the institutional environment. If it is hard to enforce
contracts because the courts do not work, a ﬁrm gains little from registering its
business activity (Marcouiller and Young, 1995; S. Johnson et al., 1997). In this
view the state needs to invest in setting up and running a commercial court system
to deter unofﬁcial activity.
Most of the existing empirical research on the unofﬁcial economy uses macro
data, such as the amount of cash in circulation or electricity consumption. These
estimates consistently show countries with inefﬁcient regulatory environments and
a great deal of corruption have unofﬁcial activity in excess of 40% of GDP
(Schneider and Enste, 1998; S. Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998;
Friedman et al., 1999). Post-communist countries offer an opportunity to examine
the determinants of unofﬁcial activity because, starting from similar levels of
unofﬁcial activity, they have diverged in terms of regulatory environment (EBRD,
1997). According to the macro data, the size of the unofﬁcial economy differs
greatly between East European countries and members of the former Soviet Union
(S. Johnson et al., 1997) estimate that in 1995 the unofﬁcial economy in Poland
was less than 15% of GDP but in Russia and Ukraine it was around 50%.
This paper investigates the reasons for ﬁrms to hide using ﬁrm-level data from a
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1 Slovakia, and Ukraine. The data show the ﬁve countries fall into two groups,
Russia and Ukraine on the one hand and Poland, Romania, and Slovakia on the
other. The former Soviet countries are more hostile to business than the East
European countries by all of our measures. A striking 90% of the Russian and
Ukrainian managers say it is normal for bribes to be paid to government ofﬁcials.
Corruption is less pervasive though not uncommon in the East European countries:
in Slovakia 40% say bribes are paid, and in Poland and Romania 20%. The ﬁrms
suffer extortion not only from bureaucrats but also from criminal gangs. Around
90% of the managers in Russia and Ukraine said ﬁrms in their industry pay for
‘protection’ of their activities. In Eastern Europe the maﬁa is less of a problem:
15% of Slovakian managers, and still fewer Polish (8%) and Romanian (1%)
managers, said protection payments are normally made. The ﬁrms’ tax payments
are higher in Russia and Ukraine than in the other three countries. A cost to the
ﬁrm of operating outside the formal economy might be that it can rely less on the
protection of the courts, which might make it hard to sustain contracts with its
trading partners. When asked whether they could use courts to enforce contracts
with trading partners, just over a half in Russia and Ukraine said they could,
whereas two-thirds or more in Slovakia, Poland, and Romania said they could.
All the ﬁrms in our survey are registered ﬁrms, so all are in the formal
2 economy, but many of them hide at least some output. Underreported sales are
highest in Ukraine (averaging 41% of total sales) and Russia (29%), and much
lower in Slovakia, Romania, and Poland (between 5 and 7%). Managers in Russia
and Ukraine, then, face worse bureaucratic corruption, more maﬁa extortion,
higher taxes, and a less effective court system. They also hide more of their output.
Comparing averages across the countries, therefore, gives support to all four
explanations for hiding.
In ﬁrm-level regressions with the percentage of sales underreported as the
dependent variable, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association between the underreporting of
sales and the bribing of corrupt ofﬁcials. No such association shows in the
regressions between underreporting and either protection payments to the maﬁa,
tax payments, or the perceived workability of the courts. These results suggest
either that avoiding bureaucratic corruption is an incentive for unofﬁcial activity or
that ﬁrms that hide their output need to pay bribes. Unfortunately, our data do not
allow us to distinguish between these two possibilities.
1Our surveys were undertaken in May and June of 1997 for Russia and Ukraine, and from September
to December of 1997 in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. The survey was designed to ﬁnd similar ﬁrms
in similar cities in all ﬁve countries (and is described in more detail in S. Johnson, McMillan and
Woodruff, 1998). Our full sample includes about 300 manufacturing ﬁrms with between seven and 370
employees in each country.
2Thus we are examining a different aspect of the underground economy than other micro-level
studies (such as de Soto (1989), and Marcouiller and Young (1995)) that focus on ﬁrms that are
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Section 2 reports in detail our estimates of the average size and distribution of
the underreported output in each of the ﬁve countries. Section 3 explains the four
possible reasons for hiding. Section 4 presents our data on taxation, corruption,
and the courts. Section 5 reports ﬁrm-level regressions that have the percentage of
output hidden as the dependent variable. Section 6 concludes.
2. The extent of unofﬁcial activity
Our total sample of interviewees includes 303 ﬁrms in Poland, 308 ﬁrms in
Slovakia, 321 ﬁrms in Romania, 269 ﬁrms in Russia, and 270 ﬁrms in Ukraine.
Firms were asked a series of questions about unreported sales and wages and
unofﬁcial payments made to government ofﬁcials. Because of the sensitive nature
of the subject, questions were phrased in terms of actions of ‘typical ﬁrms in your
3 industry.’ Further basic descriptive data about the sample is available in
appendices from the authors.
Table 1 shows that the mean level of underreported sales (as a percent of total
Table 1
Hidden activities
Poland Slovakia Romania Russia Ukraine
Total ﬁrms in sample 303 308 321 269 270
Hidden activity
Percentage of sales not 5.4 7.4 5.7 28.9 41.2
reported for all ﬁrms:
for privatized ﬁrms 3.8 6.2 3.9 36.2 45.7
start-ups 5.9 7.7 5.9 18.7 31.7
a t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (1.57) (0.79) (9.26) (18.10)
Number of observations 259 200 204 132 150
Percentage of salaries 8.6 7.6 7.6 26.1 37.9
not reported:
privatized ﬁrms 6.2 5.5 4.5 35.8 41.8
for start-ups 9.3 8.1 8.0 12.8 29.7
t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (0.45) (0.50) (5.54) (13.10)
Number of observations 257 200 199 116 148
a The reported t-statistic is from the test that a particular country’s mean differs from Poland’s mean.
3For example, the speciﬁc questions on hidden sales and wages were prefaced by ‘It is thought that
many ﬁrms in your industry, in order to survive and grow, may need to misreport their operational and
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sales) is highest in Ukraine (41%), then Russia (29%), then Slovakia (7%), then
Romania (6%) and then Poland (5%). The percent of ﬁrms saying that no sales are
hidden is 74.1% in Poland, 53% in Slovakia, 60.3% in Romania, 32% in Russia,
and just 1% in Ukraine. The level of underreporting is similar for salaries (see
Table 1) – on average it is a little lower for Russia and Ukraine and a little higher
for the three East European countries. Russia and Ukraine have a much lower
response rate to the questions about the unofﬁcial economy or about taxation,
4 regulation, and corruption. Given that we ﬁnd a much higher level of hidden
activity and corruption in Russia and Ukraine, the unwillingness of ﬁrms to answer
these questions is not a surprise.
Note that our data covers only ﬁrms that are at least partially registered.
Through omitting ﬁrms that are completely unregistered, we are missing a
potentially important part of the economy. Presumably, the effects of this omission
are more serious in a country like Russia, where there are more reasons to hide.
Overall, the effect of this is to bias our estimates of hidden activity downwards
where there is more hidden activity.
Table 1 reports t-tests comparing the mean level of unofﬁcial activity (sales or
salaries) among the ﬁrms in our Polish sample with the mean level among ﬁrms in
each of the other four countries. The t-tests show no signiﬁcant differences
5 between Poland and either Slovakia or Romania. However, the difference between
Poland and Russia or Ukraine is highly signiﬁcant for both sales and salaries.
While all of our sampled ﬁrms are privately owned, some had been spun off
from state-owned enterprises and others had been newly created. In Russia and
Ukraine, managers of spin-off ﬁrms say that ﬁrms underreport sales to a greater
extent than do managers of startups. This difference between spin-offs’ and
startups’ propensity to hide sales is signiﬁcant in both Russia (t-statistic of 2.6)
and Ukraine (t-statistic of 3.2). In Poland, Slovakia and Romania, on the other
hand, startups hide a larger percentage of sales and wage payments than do
6 spin-offs, though none of the differences is signiﬁcant at the country level.
Our estimates of hidden activity may seem large but actually are quite similar to
7 those available from two independent ‘macro’ methodologies. The Lacko (1996,
1997a,b, 1999) method is based on the household use of electricity beyond simple
consumption. She ﬁnds the unofﬁcial economy to be 14% of total GDP in Poland,
10% in Slovakia, and 18% in Romania, but much larger in the former Soviet
Union: 41% in Russia and 47% in Ukraine as cited by Schneifer and Enste, 1998.
4The response rate for hidden sales was 85% in Poland, 65% in Slovakia, 64% in Romania, 49% in
Russia, and 56% in Ukraine.
5We tested for differences in the means between Poland and the other countries.
6When these three countries are combined, startups hide a signiﬁcantly larger share of their wage bill
(8.5 vs. 5.7%, t 51.90). These t-statistics are not shown in the table.
7For details and an assessment see the survey by Schneider and Enste (1998). For post-communist
countries they focus on Lacko (1996, 1997a,b) and S. Johnson et al. (1997) but the other evidence they
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S. Johnson et al., (1997) ﬁnd that unofﬁcial GDP as a percent of total GDP in
1995 was 13% in Poland, 6% in Slovakia, and 19% in Romania. In contrast, they
8 ﬁnd that the unofﬁcial economy was 42% of GDP in Russia and 49% in Ukraine.
3. Determinants of unofﬁcial activity
The literature on the underground economy suggests four possible determinants
of unofﬁcial activity. The ﬁrst three relate to the beneﬁts of being underground,
and the fourth to the cost.
First, a higher effective tax rate will tend to induce more activity to go
underground. In this case, ﬁrms hide production and proﬁts simply to reduce their
tax burden (Schneider and Enste, 1998). The link between higher marginal tax
rates and more tax avoidance is straightforward, but there is a caveat. It is possible
that the penalties for tax evasion increase with the amount of unpaid taxes, in
which case higher tax rates may not create an incentive to hide (Andreoni et al.,
1998).
Second, more corruption will increase the incentive to divert activities under-
ground (Shleifer, 1997). In this case, ﬁrms divert activity underground in order to
reduce their vulnerability to extortion by government ofﬁcials. The causality could
be reversed, however: the level of corruption could be the outcome of a process in
which the ﬁrm decides how much to hide and the bureaucrat determines how much
to charge. Hiding more may require more bribe payments, and may still be
worthwhile if it reduces the total tax plus corruption burden of the ﬁrm. In this
case, hiding causes bribes, rather than the other way around. In this paper we only
able to test for a correlation between the incidence of corruption and hiding
activity. Our ﬁndings will not indicate the direction of causation.
Third, a higher rate of extortion by maﬁa may also induce more unofﬁcial
activity. The reasoning is the same as for bribes, except in this case the maﬁa
collects the extortion payments. While the maﬁa may also extract payments from
hidden activities, hiding may involve concealment both from the authorities and
from private criminal groups. Anecdotal evidence indicates that criminals in
former communist countries obtain their information via government employees,
from tax returns and statistical reporting (Gustafson, 1999, Chapter 6). As with
bureaucratic corruption, the causality could be reversed: protection rackets may
8In comparing the average amount of underreporting by the ﬁrms in our survey with the economy-
wide estimates of the size of the unofﬁcial economy, we should note the following. (a) Our surveyed
ﬁrms are all registered ﬁrms, hiding part of their output. We did not survey unregistered ﬁrms, all of
whose output presumably goes unreported. For this reason the underreporting implied by our survey
should be smaller than the economy-wide estimates. (b) Our ﬁrms are relatively small. Since it is easier
for the government to monitor large ﬁrms than small ﬁrms, we might expect more underreporting from
our surveyed ﬁrms than from larger ﬁrms. For this reason the underreporting implied by our survey
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prey more on ﬁrms that hide than on ﬁrms that fully report their output to the
authorities.
Fourth, there are also costs to underreporting output (Marcouiller and Young,
1995; Friedman et al., 1999). The amount of output hidden will vary with the
opportunity cost of hiding. If its activities are underground, the ﬁrm cannot appeal
to the courts to enforce its contracts. The cost of operating underground is that the
ﬁrm might have to deal with a restricted set of trading partners whom for some
reason the ﬁrm regards as trustworthy, foregoing gains from trade with a broader
set of potential trading partners (Johnson et al., 1999). It may also be difﬁcult to
raise equity capital, because outside owners would want to see some veriﬁcation of
what the ﬁrm is actually doing. Similarly, it may be harder to borrow from a bank
because to do so would require ofﬁcial documentation, especially if the bank
requires collateral and if the process of hiding economic activity involves
concealing the true ownership of assets. Thus ﬁrms are more likely to hide output
if the economy has underdeveloped market-supporting institutions.
To summarize: the literature predicts a positive association between hiding and
tax rates (though this could be reversed if penalties for tax evasion increase with
the amount of unpaid taxes); a positive association between hiding and either
bureaucratic corruption or maﬁa extortion (though the causality could go in either
direction); and a negative relation between hiding and the beneﬁts of being in the
formal sector. These possible causes of hiding will be examined in the regressions
of Section 5. Before going to the regressions, however, we use descriptive
statistics to compare the determinants of unofﬁcial activity across the ﬁve
countries.
4. Cross-country evidence
Tables 1 and 2 present the cross-country comparisons of hidden activity and
variables representing the four possible causes of hidden activity outlined above.
The country level data clearly show clear differences between Russia and Ukraine
on the one hand, and Poland, Slovakia and Romania on the other hand. These
ﬁndings are consistent with those of other researchers. Frye and Shleifer (1997),
for example, argue that the Russian government acts like a ‘grabbing hand,’
impeding investment, whereas the Polish government does not. Ukraine, according
to our data, also has a grabbing-hand government, whereas Slovakia and Romania
are similar to Poland.
Across the ﬁve countries, we ﬁnd evidence supporting all four of the possible
causes of hidden activity. Hidden sales are highest in Ukraine and Russia, and so
are the measures of taxes, corruption and ‘other protection’ payments. The beneﬁts
of keeping activity formal — the availability of loans and the ability to use the
legal system — are greater in the three Eastern European countries.
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Table 2
Causes of hidden activities
Poland Slovakia Romania Russia Ukraine
Total ﬁrms in sample 303 308 321 269 270
Taxation
Taxes as a % of sales 15.5 16.4 17.2 23.9 24.2
for privatized ﬁrms 14.5 15.8 12.9 23.0 22.8
for start-ups 15.8 16.6 17.8 25.0 27.6
t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
a (using Poland as base case) – (1.03) (2.01) (11.00) (12.30)
Number of observations 277 278 321 119 135
Other payments to government
as percent of sales 3.9% 3.8 4.8 6.0 7.2
for privatized ﬁrms 4.3 2.3 6.0 6.2 7.1
for start-ups 3.8 4.3 4.6 5.8 7.3
t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (0.12) (1.90) (6.40) (7.80)
Number of observations 277 278 321 74 65
Proﬁts in 1996 as a % of sales 10 6 13 21 18
for privatized ﬁrms 8 5 10 20 18
for start-ups 11 6 13 21 19
t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (5.80) (4.20) (14.00) (9.60)
Number of observations 293 292 320 245 229
Regulation and corruption
Percent of managers time spent
on government/regulatory matters 10.3 11.8 8.0 18.3 25.4
for privatized ﬁrms 12.9 11.3 10.9 18.4 24.7
for start-ups 9.5 12.0 7.6 18.5 27.3
T-statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (1.46) (2.60) (7.42) (14.00)
Number of observations 302 306 320 201 199
Percent who think ﬁrms make
extralegal payments for
government services 20.0 38.0 20.0 91.0 87.0
for privatized ﬁrms 16.7 30.4 15.0 93.3 86.8
for start-ups 21.1 40.5 20.7 88.0 90.0
t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (5.00) (0.04) (17.3) (13.9)
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Table 2. Continued
Poland Slovakia Romania Russia Ukraine
Percent of ﬁrms saying that
ﬁrms make unofﬁcial
payments for licences 19.3 42.2 17.0 91.7 87.5
for privatized ﬁrms 18.2 30.4 12.5 93.8 87.7
for start-ups 19.7 45.7 17.7 88.5 90.0
t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (6.30) (0.74) (18.30) (14.70)
Number of observations 300 303 317 120 88
Maﬁa protection
Percent of ﬁrms saying
that ﬁrms pay for
‘protection’: 8.0 14.9 0.6 92.9 88.8
for privatized ﬁrms 9.1 10.0 0.0 94.0 88.6
for start-ups 7.6 16.4 0.7 90.9 91.7
t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (2.70) (4.63) (29.90) (25.30)
Number of observations 302 308 320 126 107
Beneﬁts from being in the formal sector
Percent saying courts can be
used to enforce an agreement: 72.9 67.9 86.9 58.4 54.7
for privatized ﬁrms 72.7 75.7 80.0 62.9 62.1
for start-ups 73.0 65.6 87.9 53.4 36.6
t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (1.37) (4.43) (4.36) (4.64)
Number of observations 303 308 321 269 269
Percent of ﬁrms with
outside ownership: 57 45 41 83 87
for privatized ﬁrms 89 65 95 100 97
for start-ups 48 39 34 71 77
t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (2.95) (4.00) (3.10) (4.30)
Number of observations 301 305 321 36 55
Received credit 1996 48.8 27.6 24.1 17.0 13.8
for privatized ﬁrms 42.2 44.3 47.5 21.5 14.7
for start-ups 50.6 22.7 20.8 12.0 11.1
t-Statistic for difference
in means for all ﬁrms
(using Poland as base case) – (5.53) (6.62) (8.20) (9.12)
Number of observations 303 308 319 236 232
a The reported t-statistic is from the test that a particular country’s mean differs from Poland’s mean.504 S. Johnson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 495–520
government, even when the payments are ofﬁcial. We therefore phrased questions
about these payments in terms of payments made by ‘ﬁrms in your sector.’
However, managers presumably most often respond based on their own ex-
periences, and with caution we believe the responses can be interpreted as
indicating the ﬁrms’ own payments.
In general, the response rates to the questions related to the possible causes of
hidden activity were in excess of 90% in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. In Russia
and Ukraine, on the other hand, only about a third of the ﬁrms responded to these
questions. Tables 1 and 2 indicate both the numbers of ﬁrms surveyed in each
country and also the number of responses for each question.
4.1. Taxation
Ofﬁcially, tax rates in all ﬁve countries are quite similar (see the Appendix for
more detail). In terms of corporate taxation and social security tax, Russia and
Ukraine have, if anything, lower posted rates than the three East European
countries. According to our respondents, however, taxes as a percentage of sales
are signiﬁcantly higher in Russia and Ukraine than in the other three countries;
9 they are lowest in Poland. The Romanian ﬁrms also reported signiﬁcantly more
taxation than did the Polish ﬁrms. Other payments to the government are also
higher in Russia and Ukraine than in other countries (S. Johnson, McMillan and
Woodruff, 1998).
Given that taxes are levied on corporate income, however, these ﬁndings on
taxation may just be a consequence of ﬁrms being more proﬁtable in Russia,
Ukraine, and Romania. Taking the midpoint of categorical responses, proﬁts
average 21% of sales in Russia, 18% of sales in Ukraine, and 13% of sales in
Romania. In Poland, proﬁts average 10% of sales and in Slovakia 6% of sales.
Managers of startups report higher taxes as a percentage of sales than do managers
10 of spin-off ﬁrms in all the countries. This likely also reﬂects the greater
proﬁtability of startups.
4.2. Corruption
Thicker webs of regulation lend themselves to greater extraction of bribes by
bureaucrats. We asked the respondent to estimate the fraction of his or her time
devoted to various activities. The averaged responses to time spent on ‘matters
9To make it easier to obtain comparable information, we asked managers to report taxes and other
payments as a percent of total sales. However, it is possible that these numbers are only a percent of
ofﬁcially reported sales. This would imply a lower effective tax burden in Russia and Ukraine, although
it would conﬁrm the stronger incentive in those countries for ﬁrms not to report all their activities.
10The difference between startups and spinoffs is signiﬁcant only for Romania (t-statistic of 2.9) and
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related to all levels of government/regulatory activity (including taxes, licenses,
labor, and trade regulations),’ shown in Table 2, provide a measure of the
regulatory burden in each of the countries. Managers in Russia and Ukraine say
they spend, respectively, a ﬁfth and a quarter of their time dealing with the
government, much more than their counterparts in the other three countries.
Managers of startups spend more time dealing with the government than do
managers of spin-off ﬁrms in Russia, Ukraine and Slovakia. This question also has
the virtue of being less intrusive, and hence the response rates are much higher
than for our more direct measures of corruption. Even in Russia and Ukraine,
almost 75% of the managers responded to this question.
Table 2 also shows answers to a series of questions intended to measure the
incidence of bribes more directly. As with the other questions, these were phrased
in terms of ‘typical ﬁrms in the industry.’ Managers were asked whether ﬁrms
typically make ‘direct or indirect payments to government ofﬁcials to obtain
permissions and licenses,’ and whether ﬁrms must make ‘unofﬁcial or extralegal
payments’ for government services. The data clearly show that bribes are much
more extensive in Russia and Ukraine than in Eastern Europe. About 90% of ﬁrms
Russian and Ukrainian respondents say ﬁrms make extralegal payments for
11 licenses and services. Among the three remaining countries, the percentage
reporting such payments is higher in Slovakia (40%) than in Poland (20%) and
Romania (20%; see Table 2). Note, however, that given the nature of our data we
cannot determine whether ﬁrms hide output in order to pay less bribes or whether
ﬁrms that hide more output have to pay more bribes.
4.3. Maﬁa protection
Almost all (90%) of the managers in Russia and Ukraine said ﬁrms in their
12 industry make ‘a payment for the ‘protection’ of their activities’ (Table 2). In
contrast, only 15% of Slovakian managers, and even lower levels of Polish (8%)
and Romanian (1%) managers, said such payments were common. We use the
11A 1996 survey of managers of Russian small and medium enterprises found similarly widespread
corruption: 90% reported being subject to ‘extortion by government ofﬁcials’ (compared with our 91%
making extralegal payments) (OECD, 1997, p. 137).
12These numbers are plausible, although somewhat higher than commonly believed. In a 1996 survey
of the Russian managers of small and medium enterprises (OECD, 1997, p. 137), 83% said they were
subject to ‘extortion based on threats of violence’ (compared with our 93% saying payments for
protection are made). In the 1996 survey of Russian shopkeepers by Frye and Shleifer (1997), 76% said
one cannot operate a store without paying private security agencies and 39% said they had been
contacted by the maﬁa in the previous 6 months; among Polish shopkeepers the corresponding numbers
were 8 and 6% (compared with our 8% of Polish managers saying protection payments are made). A
referee points out that these numbers may be consistent with our estimates, given that our information
comes only from ﬁrms that are at least partly registered. This would require that completely
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response to this question to indicate payments to maﬁa or other private protection
rackets.
4.4. Beneﬁts from being in the formal sector
We have three measures for the beneﬁts of being in the formal sector. First, we
asked managers whether they could rely on courts to enforce contracts with trading
partners. The lowest percentage of positive responses came from managers in
Russia and Ukraine, where slightly more than half expressed conﬁdence in courts.
Two-thirds of managers in Slovakia said that courts were effective, the lowest
level of any of the three Eastern European countries. A lack of faith in the courts
may create an incentive to be unofﬁcial.
Being formal might make it easier to obtain credit. Firms in Poland were
signiﬁcantly more likely to have received a loan from a bank in 1996. Almost half
(49%) of ﬁrms in Poland said they had a loan, compared to a quarter of the ﬁrms
in Slovakia and Romania and about 15% of the ﬁrms in Russian and Ukraine.
However, the Russian and Ukrainian ﬁrms, both spin-offs and startups, were much
more likely to have had access to credit when they started the ﬁrm. Access to
credit does not appear to be a major consideration in the decision to hide activity.
Remaining formal may also allow ﬁrms to have access to outside equity ﬁnance.
Coordinating multiple sets of books, which is an essential part of hiding activity, is
likely to be much more difﬁcult once partners from outside the immediate family
are added. We asked managers who owned the ﬁrms. Again it is noteworthy that
Russian and Ukrainian ﬁrms were hesitant to provide ownership information. A
ﬁfth or less of ﬁrms in these two countries responded to this question, while the
response rate in the other three countries was near 100%. Among ﬁrms respond-
ing, the percentage of ﬁrms with some outside ownership is highest in Ukraine
(87%) and Russia (83%), and lowest in Romania (41%).
4.5. Correlations with hidden sales
To simplify the presentation, we combine the countries into the two groups
indicated by the data in Tables 1 and 2. The correlations for Poland, Slovakia and
Romania are shown in Table 3 and those for Russia and Ukraine in Table 4. In
both regions, there is a strong positive correlation between hidden sales and hidden
salaries.
In Poland, Slovakia, and Romania, hidden activity is positively correlated with
making extralegal payments for services and making indirect payments for
licenses. More proﬁtable ﬁrms hide more of their activity. Hiding is negatively
correlated with having owners outside the manager’s immediate family. There are
no signiﬁcant correlations between the level of hidden activity and any of the other
variables shown on Table 3.


























































Correlation with hidden activities: Poland, Slovakia and Romania
a Poland, Slovakia and Romania
% of sales % of wages Taxes as a Other % of time Extra-legal Extra Payments Courts can Outside Bank
hidden hidden % of sales payments to on regulatory payments payments for enforce ownership loan in
government matters for licences protection contracts 1996
% of wages hidden 0.68
(642, ,0.01)
Taxes as a % 0.02 0.04
of sales (623, 0.55) (618, 0.36)
Other payments to 20.02 20.004 20.21
government, % of sales (623, 0.55) (618, 0.93) (876, 0.01)
% of manager’s time 20.03 0.03 20.01 0.03
on regulatory matters (660, 0.41) (653, 0.41) (872, 0.81) (872, 0.45)
Firms make extra-legal 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.02 20.04
payments for services (656, ,0.01) (648, ,0.01) (864, 0.03) (864, 0.64) (915, 0.19)
Firms make extra-legal 0.16 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.5
payments for licenses (658, ,0.01) (651, ,0.01) (865, 0.07) (865, 0.43) (916, 0.41) (910, ,0.01)
Firms make payments 20.01 20.05 20.01 0.06 0.002 0.16 0.17
for protection (663, 0.78) (656, 0.25) (875, 0.76) (875, 0.07) (926, 0.94) (918, ,0.01) (920, ,0.01)
Courts can enforce 20.01 0.03 0.03 20.03 20.06 20.002 20.02 20.11
contracts (663, 0.75) (656, 0.41) (876, 0.37) (876, 0.34) (928, 0.05) (919, 0.96) (920, 0.50) (930, ,0.01)
Firm has outside 20.07 20.07 20.05 20.02 0.002 20.03 20.05 20.02 0.03
ownership (659, 0.08) (651, 0.06) (871, 0.13) (871, 0.66) (923, 0.96) (914, 0.31) (915, 0.16) (925, 0.65) (927, 0.41)
Firm had bank loan 0.02 20.02 20.07 20.05 0.001 20.09 20.01 20.01 0.02 0.13
in 1996 (661, 0.60) (654, 0.60) (874, 0.03) (874, 0.14) (926, 0.99) (917, ,0.01) (918, 0.67) (928, 0.80) (930, 0.48) (925, ,0.01)
Proﬁts in 1996 0.04 0.1 0.04 0.03 20.05 20.02 20.05 20.1 0.02 20.1 20.1
(649, 0.28) (642, 0.01) (855, 0.2) (855, 0.4) (901, 0.14) (892, 0.57) (893, 0.12) (903, ,0.01) (905, 0.55) (902, ,0.01) (903, ,0.01)


























































Correlation with hidden activities: Russia and Ukraine
a Russia and Ukraine
% of sales % of wages Taxes as a Other payments to % of time on Extra-legal Extra payments Payments for Courts can enforce Outside Bank loan
Hidden Hidden % of sales government regulatory matters Payments for licences Protection contracts ownership in 1996
% wages hidden 0.92
(257, ,0.01)
Taxes as a % 20.65 20.68
of sales (220, ,0.01) (205, ,0.01)
Other payments to 20.29 20.25 0.19
government, % of sales (220, ,0.01) (205, ,0.01) (254, ,0.01)
% of manager’s time 20.38 20.36 0.37 0.23
on regulatory matters (252 ,0.01) (236, ,0.01) (234, ,0.01) (234,,0.01)
Firms make extra-legal 20.38 20.35 0.25 0.25 0.27
payments for services (150, ,0.01) (136, ,0.01) (132, ,0.01) (132, ,0.01) (172, ,0.01)
Firms make extra-legal 20.37 20.34 0.25 0.25 0.27 NA
payments for licenses (160, ,0.01) (146, 0.01) (142, ,0.01) (142, ,0.01) (180, ,0.01)
Firms make payments 20.37 20.33 0.2 0.21 0.28 0.95 0.95
for protection (186, ,0.01) (172, ,0.01) (167, 0.01) (167, ,0.01) (206, ,0.01) (191, ,0.01) (202, ,0.01)
Courts can enforce 0.17 0.17 20.29 20.08 20.16 20.05 20.04 20.03
contracts (275, ,0.01) (257, ,0.01) (254, ,0.01) (254, 0.22) (400, ,0.01) (198, 0.48) (208, 0.52) (233, 0.68)
Firm has outside NA NA 0.24 0.24 0.07 20.06 20.06 20.04 0.05
ownership (56, 0.07) (56, 0.08) (76, 0.56) (30, 0.75) (30, 0.75) (41, 0.78) (91, 0.61)
Firm had bank loan 0.43 0.43 20.37 20.21 20.19 20.11 20.09 20.08 0.07 20.02
in 1996 (260, ,0.01) (243, ,0.01) (241, ,0.01) (241, ,0.01) (371, ,0.01) (183, 0.15) (192, 0.19) (218, 0.23) (468, 0.16) (81, 0.85)
Proﬁts in 1996 0.21 0.17 20.12 20.27 20.09 20.01 20.01 0.04 0.004 0.06 0.09
(272, ,0.01) (254, ,0.01) (249, 0.05) (249, ,0.01) (379, 0.09) (190, 0.85) (200, 0.87) (225, 0.57) (474, 0.93) (87, 0.57) (432, 0.06)
a The number of observations and signiﬁcance level are in parentheses.S. Johnson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 495–520 509
Eastern Europe, we ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms that make large illegal payments to
one set of government ofﬁcials do not reduce their tax burden, but do become
involved in other illegal payments. Making extralegal payments for services and
indirect payments for licenses are positively correlated with the level of taxes as a
percent of sales and with making ‘protection’ payments.
The correlations between hidden activity and the measures of its causes are
distinctly different in Russia and Ukraine (see Table 4). There is a negative
correlation between hidden activity and making extralegal or indirect payments for
services and licenses, and a positive correlation between hidden activity and both
the proﬁtability of a ﬁrm and its manager’s conﬁdence in the legal system. In
contrast to Eastern Europe, taxes and ‘other payments’ to the government are
positively correlated in Russia and Ukraine. They are also negatively correlated
with the extent of hidden activity. The correlations shown in Table 4 should be
interpreted with some caution, however, because there is little variation in many of
the measures. For example, only six of the 150 managers responding say ﬁrms do
not make extralegal payments for services. These six managers say ﬁrms hide
13 between 85 and 98% of their activity.
Across both the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union countries the
correlations offer support for all four possible causes of hidden activity.Within the
group of three Eastern European countries, where the variance in the data is
greater than in the former Soviet Union countries, we ﬁnd that the measures of
corruption correlate most strongly with the level of hidden activity.We next turn to
ﬁrm level regressions in which we can control for other ﬁrm characteristics.
5. Firm level regressions for Eastern Europe
Table 5 reports the basic results from regressions with the percent of hidden
sales on the left-hand side. The regression sample is limited to ﬁrms in Poland,
Romania, and Slovakia. While the Russian and Ukrainian ﬁrms in our sample
answered many of the questions about unofﬁcial activity, ﬁve out of six of them
refused to answer one or more important question. For those ﬁrms on which we do
have enough data, there is too little variance in some of the key variables for
regressions to be meaningful. For example, only two of 105 ﬁrms for which there
are complete data say that ﬁrms do not make extralegal payments for services;
only four say ﬁrms don’t make payments for protection. As a result, the
regressions provide little information beyond that provided by the correlations
13Many of the other correlations hold for privatized ﬁrms but not for startups. For example, there is
no signiﬁcant correlation between hidden sales and conﬁdence in courts among startups (a p-value of


























































a Tobit and probit regression results (Poland, Slovakia and Romania only)
Dependent variable: percent of sales hidden
Just industry Tax Corruption Maﬁa Beneﬁts All four With human Firm reports Hidden
and variables variables variables of being sets of capital positive level salaries as
country in formal measures and ﬁrm of hidden sales dependent
dummies sector together controls (probit) variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Taxation
Taxes as a percent
of sales – 2.14 – – – 20.07 20.30 20.1 4.49
(4.62) (4.62) (4.66) (0.20) (5.43)
Corruption variables
Firm makes extra-legal
payment for services – – 2.51 – – 2.51 2.55 0.11 2.31
Firm makes extra-legal (1.18) (1.18) (1.18) (0.06) (1.42)
payment for licences – – 3.95 – – 3.84 3.88 0.23 4.58
(1.20) (1.22) (1.22) (0.06) (1.42)
Maﬁa variable
Firm pays for
protection – – – 20.17 – 21.07 21.00 20.07 21.82
(2.00) (1.96) (1.96) (0.09) (2.45)
Beneﬁts of being in the formal sector
Courts can enforce
contracts – – – – 20.55 20.74 20.44 20.02 0.76
Firm has owners outside (1.18) (1.18) (1.18) (0.05) (1.38)
family – – – – 21.33 21.03 20.70 20.06 20.18
Firm received a bank (1.00) (0.96) (1.07) (0.05) (1.25)
loan in 1996 – – – – 0.29 0.52 0.52 0.0002 21.07


























































Proﬁt in 1996 – 12.78 – – – 10.16 8.39 0.35 12.55
(5.58) (5.54) (5.62) (0.2) (6.50)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies
Slovakia 4.03 4.47 2.92 4.03 3.84 3.33 3.77 0.20 20.27
(1.18) (1.22) (1.18) (1.22) (1.22) (1.26) (1.33) (0.06) (1.56)
Romania 1.37 0.85 1.33 1.37 1.29 1.00 1.51 0.09 22.00
(1.18) (1.22) (1.18) (1.22) (1.26) (1.26) (1.44) (0.06) (1.65)
Measures of manager’s human capital included?
No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Log of ﬁrm age – – – – – – 1.81 0.06 1.51
Log of employment – – – – – – (0.96) (0.04) (1.56)
20.67 20.03 20.85
Dummy for start-up – – – – – – (0.59) (0.03) (0.71)
0.33 20.02 0.76
Number of (1.44) (0.06) (1.65)
observations 590 590 590 590 590 590 590 590 582
Chi-squared 32.3 32.7 61.0 32.3 34.3 66.7 72.8 90.6 69.9
Percent uncensored 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 – 44.5
a Reported coefﬁcients in tobit regressions are marginal effects for nontruncated observations. Standard errors are in parentheses.512 S. Johnson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 495–520
reported in Table 4. The regression results for these countries are available from
14 the authors.
Because almost two-thirds of the ﬁrms in our East European sample report that
no sales are hidden, the reported regressions are tobits with left-handed censoring
at zero. On average the surveyed ﬁrms included in these regressions said 6.8% of
sales are hidden; the average for ﬁrms with a non-zero response was 17.9%.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 reports results from a benchmark regression that
includes only industry dummies and country dummies for Slovakia and Romania.
The sample includes the 590 observations for which the complete set of data is
available. The coefﬁcients shown in all of the tobits are the marginal effect of a
15 change in the independent variable in the uncensored range. Standard errors are
in parentheses. All of the regressions in Table 5 include a set of nine industry
dummies. Both Slovakia and Romania have more hidden activity than Poland,
although the result for Romania is not signiﬁcant. Conditional on hiding some
activity, a ﬁrm in Slovakia hides almost 3% more and a ﬁrm in Romania hides just
over 1% more than a ﬁrm in Poland.
Columns two through ﬁve of Table 5 add variables representing each of the four
possible causes of hidden activity — tax, corruption, maﬁa, and the measures of
beneﬁts of being in the formal sector, respectively.We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects of
16 the maﬁa or the beneﬁts of being in the formal sector. The insigniﬁcance of the
variable representing the maﬁa may reﬂect the fact that only 6% of the regression
sample say payments for protection are common. Taxation as a percentage of sales
is not associated with hidden activity, but there is a positive association between
proﬁt rates and hidden sales (t 52.3). However, the variables representing
corruption are signiﬁcant. Managers saying that ﬁrms make extralegal payments
for services report that hidden sales are 2.5 percentage points higher (t 52.1), and
saying that ﬁrms makes indirect payments for licenses is associated with almost 4
17 percentage points more hidden sales (t 53.3). None of these results are altered
when all of the variables are included together (column 6), or when a set of
controls for ﬁrm and managers characteristics is added (column 7).
Column 8 of Table 5 reports the marginal coefﬁcients from a probit regression
in which the dependent variable is one if the ﬁrm says that some sales are hidden.
14Limiting the sample to Eastern Europe reduces the variance in the independent variables, making it
harder to ﬁnd positive results of key variables such as corruption.
15We multiply the tobit coefﬁcient by the percent uncensored to obtain the marginal effect
conditional on the ﬁrm having a nonzero response.
16The sample for all of the regressions is limited to the observations for which all the variables have
valid responses. The samples for the regressions reported in columns 2–5 are each potentially larger.
Using the largest available sample has no effect on the results with one exception — the measure of
outside ownership is signiﬁcant in column 5 when the larger sample is used (t 52.3).
17We emphasize that this does not establish if ﬁrms hide more output in order to avoid bribes or if
ﬁrms that hide more have to pay higher bribes. Our results show a correlation and nothing about
causation.S. Johnson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 495–520 513
This allows us to see if there is a discontinuity at zero. We might expect, for
example, that having owners outside the manager’s family makes hiding any level
of sales more problematic. However, we ﬁnd no changes in the signiﬁcance levels
of the 4 sets of explanatory variables. The probit regression shows that making
extralegal payments for services increases the probability that some sales are
hidden by 11%, while making extra legal payments for licenses raises the
probability that some sales are hidden by 23%. Firms reporting proﬁts of 20% of
sales are 3.5% more likely to hide some sales than ﬁrms with a proﬁt rate of 10%
of sales.
The last column reports a tobit regression using percent of hidden salaries as an
alternative dependent variable. The speciﬁcation is the same as that used in column
7. The two corruption variables and the proﬁt variable remain signiﬁcant at the
0.10 level or greater, and the variables measuring tax, maﬁa and beneﬁts of the
18 formal sector all remain insigniﬁcant.
The last three columns of Table 5 include three controls for ﬁrm characteristics.
First, we include a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm is a startup; this variable is not
signiﬁcant. Managers of older ﬁrms do report signiﬁcantly higher levels of hidden
sales. The effect is not large: in the column 7 speciﬁcation, for example, a
movement of one standard deviation from the mean changes the level of hidden
sales by only 1%. Finally, the log of employment at the time of interview is not
signiﬁcant.
These regressions also include four human-capital controls: the education level
and age of the manager, and indicators of previous work experience in the private
sector and as a senior manager at a state-owned enterprise. None of these variables
is signiﬁcant in the hidden-sales equation. Managers with private-sector experience
say about 3% less of salaries are hidden (t 51.93). Managers with more education
also report higher levels of hidden salaries (t 51.72).
5.1. Discussion of results
In summary, the ﬁrm-level regressions offer no indication that taxes, maﬁa
payments, or the beneﬁts of being in the formal sector are signiﬁcantly associated
with the amount that ﬁrms hide. However, at the ﬁrm level, paying bribes is
positively associated with hiding economic activity. The regression analysis
therefore sharpens our ﬁndings from cross-country averages and simple correla-
tions. Either ﬁrms hide their activities in order to reduce the bribes they need to
pay, or they pay bribes in order to be able to hide their activities. The effects of
bureaucratic corruption show clearly in the regressions despite the fact that, for
reasons of missing data, our regressions covered only the three East European
18The sample is slightly smaller in the last column, because a few ﬁrms responding to the hidden
sales question did not respond to the hidden salaries question.514 S. Johnson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 495–520
countries and omitted Ukraine and Russia where, as described in the previous
section, bureaucratic corruption is much more prevalent.
We ﬁnd no association between hiding output and our proxies for the
opportunity cost of hiding. This might be because our regressions presume there is
a marginal effect: if the ﬁrm hides a little more output, it gets a little less value out
of access to the courts, to loans, or to outside ﬁnance. Perhaps, however, these are
not marginal effects. A ﬁrm that already has access to the courts might not lose
this access by hiding a little more of its output, for example. All of our ﬁrms are
registered. Perhaps the major difference in the effects of access to the courts is
between registered and unregistered ﬁrms, rather than between registered ﬁrms
that hide varying amounts of their output.
6. Conclusion
We have found that many registered ﬁrms sell much of their output and hire
much of their labor through unofﬁcial channels. This hiding of activity is arguably
an impediment to private-sector development in the post-communist economies.
The results from our survey conﬁrm the pattern suggested by previous estimates of
19 the size of the unofﬁcial economy. The unofﬁcial economy is signiﬁcant in
Eastern Europe, but is much larger in Russia and Ukraine. Our data allow us to
test alternative explanations for the differences across countries and across ﬁrms.
Aggregated at the country level, our data are consistent with all four of the
possible explanations for hidden activity. Hidden activity is larger in countries
where tax rates are higher, where managers are more likely to pay bribes, where
managers pay for maﬁa-type protection, and where managers have less faith in the
legal system.
Our regressions using ﬁrm-level data from Poland, Slovakia and Romania ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant association between tax rates and the extent of unofﬁcial activity in
Eastern Europe. If there is a tax rate effect, it probably lies more with the way the
tax system is operated.
We ﬁnd only weak evidence that the ability of the legal system to enforce
contracts affects entrepreneurs’ decisions on whether or not to hide their activity.
Ability to access bank loans and to involve outside owners also do not appear to
be signiﬁcant. This is probably because the ﬁrms in our sample maintain at least
some ofﬁcial activity, and the decision they make is, at the margin, how much to
report ofﬁcially, so most of the ﬁrms in our sample can have access to
government-provided public services if they want.
We ﬁnd no evidence that payments to private criminal groups affect the decision
to hide activities. This may be because we surveyed manufacturing ﬁrms that are
19Our results also conﬁrm the ﬁnding of S. Johnson et al. (1997) that ofﬁcial GDP may be
signiﬁcantly underestimated, particularly in Russia and Ukraine.S. Johnson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 495–520 515
20 relatively immune from maﬁa-run protection rackets. Most likely, however, it
indicates that organized crime is not a large problem in Eastern Europe (in contrast
to Russia and Ukraine).
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association between corruption, in the form of bribes paid
to government ofﬁcials, and the hiding of output. This is clearly far worse in
Russia and Ukraine than in Eastern Europe. Even within Eastern Europe, ﬁrms that
say bureaucrats are corrupt are more likely to hide activity. However, we cannot
distinguish whether ﬁrms hide more to avoid corruption or whether ﬁrms that hide
more have to make illegal payments; we leave this for further research.
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Appendix. Tax rates and legal environment
Tax rates
Four organizations provide information on tax rates in our sample countries
during 1997–98. Tax rates are high in all ﬁve countries, but taxes paid by ﬁrms
(i.e. corporate and social security tax rates) in Russia and Ukraine are generally
not higher, and in some instances may be lower, than in Poland, Slovakia, and
Romania. The picture for personal tax rates is mixed, with Ukraine and Romania
having the highest tax rates, followed by Slovakia and Russia, and then Poland.
Overall, however, we can conclude that the posted tax rates that ﬁrms are
supposed to pay are, if anything, higher in the East European countries of our
sample than in Russia and Ukraine.
The Heritage Foundation’s 1998 Index of Economic Freedom (B.T. Johnson et
21 al., 1998) provides the most comprehensive evaluation. For corporate taxes, the
20The previous empirical work on this issue in Russia has focussed on retail stores (Zhuravskaya and
Frye, 1998). These are vulnerable in part because they cannot move without losing a great deal of the
business’s value. Manufacturing companies can also choose to be located inside other ﬁrms (e.g. it is
very common in Russia for a small new ﬁrm to operate on the premises of a much larger privatized
ﬁrm that provides security).
21The Heritage Foundation Indices are published early in the year (e.g. the 1999 Index was available
right at the beginning of 1999) and cover the previous year (i.e. the 1999 Index really evaluates the
situation in 1998; B.T. Johnson et al., 1999).516 S. Johnson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 495–520
most relevant category for ﬁrms in our sample, these authors consider taxation to
be better (i.e. lower) in Russia and Ukraine than in the three East European
countries in our sample. Russia receives a score of 3, indicating moderate
corporate taxation (the scale is from 1 to 5, with 5 representing the worst or
highest taxation.) They say: ‘The top corporate income tax rate (including both
22 federal and regional taxes) is 35%’ (p. 293). Ukraine also receives a corporate
taxation score of 3. Its top corporate tax rate is reported as being 30%. In contrast,
Poland, Slovakia and Romania all have a corporate taxation score of 4. The top
corporate income tax rate is reported to be 38% in Poland, 40% in Slovakia and
23 38% in Romania.
In its assessment of personal income tax rates, the Heritage Foundation 1998
Index is still relatively favorable to Russia, awarding a score of 3. The authors say
the ‘top income tax rate is 35%, up from 30% last year and the average income
24 level is taxed at 12%’ (B.T. Johnson et al., 1998). Ukraine receives a score of
41, with the comments that the ‘top income tax rate is 40%’, and average income
is approximately taxed at ‘20%, down from 30% last year.’ The worst rating on
this dimension goes to Romania, which is rated as 5, indicating very high tax rates,
with the comment that the ‘top income tax rate is 60%, and the average income is
taxed at 28%.’ Income taxation in Slovakia is rated as 4: the ‘top marginal income
tax rate is 42%, with the average taxpayer subject to a rate of about 20%.’ Finally,
Poland is considered to have low income taxation. It receives a score of 2, while
22The Heritage Foundation’s tax ratings focus primarily on posted tax rates, rather than the way the
tax system is administered or whether tax inspectors are corrupt. A rating of 3 is considered ‘moderate
taxes’ and indicates ‘a progressive corporate tax system with a top rate of between 26 and 35%, or a
ﬂat tax system with tax levels above 25%’ while a rating of 4 is called ‘high taxes’ and represents ‘a
progressive corporate tax system with a top rate of between 36 and 45%, and a tax structure not fully
developed by the government or in a state of disarray’ (B.T. Johnson et al., 1998, p. 41). The same
criteria were used in the 1997 and 1999 Indexes (B.T. Johnson et al., 1997, p. 37; B.T. Johnson et al.,
1999, p. 58.)
23The Heritage Foundation’s Index covering 1998–99 gives unchanged ratings on corporate taxation
in all ﬁve countries: Russia and Ukraine are at 3, and Poland, Slovakia, Romania are at 4 (B.T. Johnson
et al., 1999). The earlier Index for 1996–97 gives Russia and Ukraine a score 31 (i.e. slightly higher
taxation than in 1998 or 1999), while Poland, Slovakia, and Romania were rated as 4 (B.T. Johnson et
al., 1997).
24A score of 2 indicates ‘low taxes,’ meaning ‘a top tax rate of 25% or below, or a ﬂat income tax
between 10 and 20%, or a top rate of 40% or below and a tax on average income below 10%.’ A score
of 3 indicates ‘moderate taxes,’ meaning ‘a top tax rate of 35% or below, or a tax on average income
below 15%.’ A score of 4 indicates ‘high taxes,’ meaning ‘a top income tax rate of 36–50%, or an
average tax level between 15 and 20%, and a tax structure not fully developed by the government or in
a state of disarray.’ A score of 5 indicates, ‘a top rate above 50% and a tax on average income between
20 and 25%, or a tax rate on average income of 25% or above regardless of the top rate, or a tax system
through which the government conﬁscates most economic output resulting from government ownership
of most economic activity’ (B.T. Johnson et al., 1998, p. 40). The criteria behind this taxation rating
have remained consistent over time (B.T. Johnson et al., 1997, 1999).S. Johnson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 495–520 517
the authors add that the ‘top income tax is 45%; the average income level is taxed
25 at a rate of 0%.’
The IMD (1998) World Competitiveness Yearbook offers independent conﬁrma-
tion of these numbers. For the countries in our sample, this source unfortunately
provides information only on Poland and Russia. IMD (1998) conﬁrms that posted
tax rates in Russia are not higher than in Poland. They report the average corporate
tax rate on proﬁt in 1997 was 35% in Russia and 38% in Poland. The employer’s
social security contribution in 1997, as a percent of GDP per capita, was 0.01% in
Russia and 48.2% in Poland. The effective personal income tax rate, as a percent
of GDP per capita, was 11.42% in Russia and 20.14% in Poland.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD (1997),
provides additional detailed relevant information, including as assessment of the
‘social security tax’ rate paid by employers (usually as a percent of wages), but
unfortunately does not provide a consistent assessment across countries. On
Russia, EBRD (1997) provides the least information but does comment that: ‘The
tax system as a whole remains unstable, non-transparent and highly onerous for
26 enterprises’ (p. 197). For Ukraine, the EBRD (1997) reports that in June 1997 a
new corporate tax law introduced a 30% base rate and a switch from revenue to
proﬁt taxation. Employers pay 37% of the wage bill for the social and pension
funds and 12% for the Chernobyl and employment funds. For Romania, the EBRD
(1997) reports a single corporate proﬁt tax rate of 38% that ‘applies to all
permanently established legal entities’ (p. 194). In addition, employer contribu-
tions to the Social Security Fund are levied at 24% of wages, the personal income
tax has a maximum rate of 60%, and the value-added tax is at a rate of 18%. For
Slovakia, EBRD (1997) reports that the corporate tax rate was reduced in 1994 to
40% and maximum personal income tax was reduced to 42%. ‘Employers and
employees contribute 38 and 12% respectively of the employees gross income for
pension, unemployment and health contributions.’ For Poland, the November 1996
Corporate Income Tax Law reduced the corporate tax rate to 38% in 1997 ‘and
provided for further cuts of 2 percentage points in each of the next three years
until a 32% rate is reached in the year 2000’ (EBRD, 1997). In the 1997 budget,
27 the three personal income tax levels were set at 20, 32 and 40%. The payroll tax
is not reported in EBRD (1997), but EBRD (1996) says it was raised to 45% in
1992 and that there was also an additional payroll tax of 3% for the Labour Fund
(p. 166).
25In the 1997 Heritage Foundation Index the ratings for income taxation were 3 for Russia, 5 for
Ukraine, 5 for Romania, 4 for Slovakia, and 2 for Poland (Johnson et al., 1997a). The only rating that
was different in the 1999 Index was a reduction in Ukraine’s rating to 4 (Johnson et al., 1999a).
26In the section ‘Transition Indicators,’ the EBRD (1996) also does not provide detailed information
about tax rates in Russia. The EBRD (1995, p. 56) reports that the enterprise proﬁt tax was 35%, the
personal income tax rate was between 12 and 30%, and the ‘payroll tax’ rate was 40% of the wage bill.
27Personal income tax rates had been raised to 21, 33, and 45% in 1994 (EBRD, 1996, p. 166).518 S. Johnson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 495–520
Finally, Price Waterhouse (1997a,b) provides comparable tax rate information
for Poland, the Slovak Republic and Russia in 1997. It reports income tax rates as
21% in Poland, 20% in the Slovak Republic, and 20% in Russia. Corporate tax
rates are given as 40% in Poland, 40% in the Slovak Republic and 43% in Russia.
Legal environment
Three organizations offer measures of these ﬁve countries’ legal environments
for business. The picture from these measures of legal and regulatory environment
is therefore fairly consistent. Poland is usually the best, followed closely by
Slovakia. Ukraine consistently scores the lowest. Russia and Romania occupy
intermediate positions, with Romania having a slight advantage in terms of
28 corruption and rule of law.
The EBRD (1997, p. 17) measure of the legal system’s ‘effectiveness’ attempts
to capture how commercial laws are being ‘enforced and administered.’ The data
is obtained from a survey of lawyers in the region and the scale runs from 1 (least
effective) to 41 (most effective). According to this index there was signiﬁcant
difference between the countries: Poland scored 41, Slovakia, Romania and
29 Russia scored 3, and Ukraine scored 2.
The Wall Street Journal’s panel of investment professionals rates the countries
according to ‘their attractiveness as a place to do business over the coming year’
on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the best (Central European Economic Review
30 1998). At the end of 1997, their overall ratings placed Poland in the lead with a
score of 7.8, followed by Russia at 6.0, Slovakia at 5.8, Romania at 5.7, and
Ukraine at 3.9. Two sub-indices particularly address the legal environment — ‘rule
of law’ and ‘corruption’. On the rule of law measure, Poland scored 9.0, Romania
scored 6.4, Slovakia scored 6.2, Russia scored 5.4, and Ukraine scored 3.9. In
terms of corruption, Poland scored 8.2, Slovakia scored 5.7, Romania scored 5.4,
Russia scored 3.7, and Ukraine scored 2.1.
The Heritage Foundation’s 1998 Index of Economic Freedom also provides
information on the legal environment (B.T. Johnson et al., 1998). A lower score
on this measure means ‘more free,’ or a more favorable environment for private
28The more detailed analysis in Johnson et al. (1997b) shows basically the same relative rankings
across all the available measures of legal reform. The largest difference is consistently between Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union (excluding the Baltics).
29The EBRD’s explanations for these scores are rather long and should be consulted by the reader
(EBRD, 1997, p. 19). In summary: 41 denotes clear commercial laws that are supported by an
effective court system; 3 indicates that the commercial laws are clear but not fully supported by the
court system; and 2 denotes ‘commercial legal rules are generally unclear and sometimes contradic-
tory.’
30See the discussion in S. Johnson et al. (1997) for details of how this panel operates and its results
in previous years. It appears to give consistent and reasonable results over time.S. Johnson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 495–520 519
31 business. The 1998 index basically measures the environment in 1997. In the
overall index, Slovakia did best with a score of 3.05, Poland scored 3.15, Romania
scored 3.3, Russia scored 3.45, and Ukraine was last again with 3.8. In terms of
property rights, Poland was ahead with a score of 2, Slovakia and Russia scored 3,
32 Romania, and Ukraine scored 4. Finally, in terms of regulation, Poland and
33 Slovakia scored 3, while Russia, Romania and Ukraine all scored 4.
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